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John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. 55 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES, FREE SPEECH, SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
Summary
Appeal from a Ninth Judicial District Court order granting a special motion to dismiss
under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, in an employment matter.
Disposition/Outcome
District Court’s order affirmed because Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute – being neutral and
procedural, and not undermining any federal interests – applies to federal causes of action, and
the plaintiff failed to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding communications protected by
the statute.
Facts and Procedural History
Greg John (“John”), a security officer with the Douglas County School District
(“DCSD”), was first suspended, then terminated, because of his unprofessional behavior. John’s
suspension came about in 2003 after a former co-worker told DCSD during his exit interview
that John made racial and sexual remarks about students, and that John videotaped specialeducation students and recorded sexually explicit narrations to accompany the video.
Additionally, a fellow employee accused John of sexual harassment. Sexual misconduct training,
anger management, and a warning that further unprofessional conduct would result in John’s
termination accompanied the two-week unpaid suspension. DCSD also banned John from using
the school’s video surveillance equipment. Upset about the disciplinary actions, John filed a
union grievance and a subsequent EEOC, both of which were decided in DCSD’s favor. When
John failed to cooperate in a 2005 investigation regarding his inappropriate acquisition of
confidential student disciplinary records, DCSD fired him.
In 2004, after the EEOC dismissed his claim, John sued DCSD and several employees
(collectively, “DCSD”) alleging: (1) religious discrimination; (2) a violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3) an unlawful free-speech restriction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
and (4) false and defamatory statements. The district court dismissed the state-based defamation
claim, but kept alive his three federal claims. Upon his termination, John amended his complaint
to include a wrongful termination claim and to add as a defendant the DCSD officer who fired
him.
DCSD moved to have the case dismissed under NRS 41.660 because the statute protects
the actions of the officials and personnel relating to the investigations of John. Additionally,
DCSD asserted all of the allegedly illegal communications actually were truthful and privileged.
Finding that DCSD’s actions were protected under NRS 41.660 and that John failed to meet his
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burden to survive a special motion to dismiss under the statute, the district court granted DCSD’s
motion. This appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPs”) are meritless suits filed
“primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights” 2 by increasing litigation
costs until the defendant’s case is weakened or abandoned. 3 As explained by the Nevada
Legislature when amending its anti-SLAPP statute in 1997, SLAPP lawsuits abuse the judicial
process by chilling, intimidating, and punishing individuals for their involvement in public
affairs. 4 The Court compared anti-SLAPP statutes to the Noerr-Penningtion immunity doctrine,
which grants general immunity to “those who petition all departments of the government for
redress.” 5 In Nevada, NRS 41.650 grants civil immunity to persons who engage in “good faith
communication in furtherance of the right to petition.” 6
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is codified at NRS 41.635 through NRS 41.670. Rather
than acting as a bar to all substantive claims that might fall under its umbrella, Nevada’s antiSLAPP statute allows meritorious claims against those whose governmental communications are
not in good faith, while prohibiting only those claims intended to abuse other citizens’ rights to
petition or communicate with their government. 7 Among the classes of protected
communications are those “regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective
governmental entity” 8 and truthful, or unknowingly false, statements before a governmental
body. 9 If a plaintiff files a lawsuit based upon a protected communication, the defendant may
file a special motion to dismiss within sixty (60) days. 10
II. Standard of Review
Specials motions to dismiss under NRS 41.660(2) are treated as motions for summary
judgment, and the granting of the motion serves as an adjudication on the merits. 11 Pursuant to
Wood v. Safeway, 12 the standard of review, like that of customary motions for summary
judgment, is de novo.
The Court explained that the party filing the special motion to dismiss under NRS
41.660(2) bears the initial burden of showing that the lawsuit is based upon a “good faith
2

Dickens v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 11 Cal Rptr. 3d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
U.S. Ex Rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
4
1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, Preamble, at 1364.
5
Empress LLC v. City and County, 419 F. 3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005).
6
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.650 (2007).
7
Id. § 41.637.
8
Id. § 41.637(2).
9
Id. § 41.637(3).
10
.Id. § 41.660(2).
11
Id. § 41.660(3)-(4).
12
121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
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communication in furtherance of the right to petition.” 13 Once this threshold is established, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to survive summary judgment on this issue. 14 If the nonmoving party meets its burden,
the case moves on; if not, it is dismissed.
III. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to Federal Claims
John argued that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to his federal claims
because federal law preempts the application of state sovereign-immunity statutes to shield
against federal civil rights claims. The Court disagreed, holding that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP
statute neither undermines federal interests nor serves as a sovereign-immunity statute.
1. The Sovereign Immunity Issue
The Court easily did away with John’s argument that because state sovereign-immunity
laws cannot insulate the state from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, 15 Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute
cannot immunize DCSD from his claims. The Court explained that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute
is not a sovereign-immunity statute because rather than barring all claims, the statute in
questions only bars unmeritorious claims designed to impede on others’ rights to free speech.
Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute actually aligns with the reasoning of holdings excluding civil
rights claims from sovereign-immunity preclusion, so federal law does not preempt its
applications to John’s claims against DCSD.
2. The Federal Interest Analysis
First, the Court held that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is both neutral and procedural,
thus giving Nevada courts the right to apply it in cases involving federal substantive claims. The
Court turned to California case law in determining that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is
procedural. California’s anti-SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada’s
statute, and the California Court of Appeals has applied it to federal civil rights claims after
finding the statute procedural in nature. 16 In drawing analogies between the California and
Nevada laws, the Court highlighted their myriad similarities, including the sixty-day window for
filing a special motion to dismiss,17 the burden-shifting process, 18 and the treatment of the
special motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. 19 Like rules of civil procedure,
the Court reasoned, Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute simply provides a pretrial mechanism for
filtering frivolous claims and does not create any substantive rights or defenses.
13

NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.650; see Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (noting that “[a] defendant filing an anti-SLAPP motion must make an initial prima facie showing that
the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act in furtherance if the defendant’s rights of petition or free speech”).
14
See Globetrotter, 63 F. Supp. at 1129 (recognizing that under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, the nonmoving
party must demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits).
15
Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 n.5, 953 P.2d 18, 23 n.5 (1998).
16
Bradbury v. Superior Court (Spencer), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 213 (Ct. App. 1996); see generally Vergos v.
McNeal, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647 (Ct. App. 2007).
17
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660(2); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
18
Globetrotter, 63 F. Supp. at 1129.
19
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660(3); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1)-(3).

Regarding neutrality, the Court found the statute to be neutral because it applies to both
state and federal claims, and to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims alike.
Additionally, it applies only to cases invoking the classes of communications enumerated in NRS
41.637. Because the statute is neutral and limited in its application, the Court held, it meets the
neutrality standard applying state procedural law to federal claims. 20
Next, the Court addressed whether application of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute would
defeat or frustrate any substantive federal rights or interests, thus precluding its application
altogether. 21 Because anti-SLAPP statutes serve similar purposes as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the “weeding out of meritless claims before trial” 22 and actually protect the right to
petition the government with repercussions, 23 the Court held that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute
did not violate any substantive government interests in this case. John’s religious discrimination
and ADA claims would have survived had he raised genuine issues of material fact regarding
DCSD’s actions. John’s First Amendment claim, stemming from his objection over the removal
of his surveillance duties, would have survived had he rebutted DCSD’s argument that, as a
matter of law, certain speech in the employment setting does not receive constitutional
protection. 24
IV. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Protects Both Individuals and Government Entities
John argued in the alternative that the communications between DCSD and its employees
were not protected because they were retaliatory and discriminatory, and they were not made to a
government agency. The Court held the employee communications were protected because NRS
41.637(2) applies to political subdivisions of the state, as defined by NRS 41.0305, 25 which
includes school districts. Additionally, the Court, following California’s lead in Raining Data
Corp. v. Barrenechea, 26 held that employers, like DCSD, also receive protection under Nevada’s
anti-SLAPP statute provided they can show the lawsuit arose from protected communications,
and that the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
The defendants presented prima facie cases that their communications were truthful or
made without knowledge of falsehood, and that they were of reasonable concern to the school
district. The burden then shifted to John to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding these
elements, which he failed to do. Thus, the Court held the district court was correct in granting
DCSD’s special motion to dismiss.
Conclusion

20

See 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 124.61 (3d ed. 2009).
Id. at ¶ 124.62.
22
Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 972.
23
Id. at 973.
24
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
25
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.640 (2007) (“Political subdivision” has the meaning ascribed to it in NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.0305 (2007)).
26
97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196 (Ct. App. 2009).
21

The Court concluded that, because Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is neutral and
procedural, and because it does not undermine any important federal interests, it applies to
federal causes of action as well as state causes of action. Additionally, the Court concluded that
the statute protects communications to all political subdivisions, including school districts, and
employers may seek its protection just as individuals may seek its protection. Thus, the Court
concluded that the district court was correct to grant the special motion to dismiss under NRS
41.660(2) because DCSD established a prima face case for protection and John failed to meet his
burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of the communications.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of John’s complaint.

